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This paper seeks to determine whether institutional changes implemented by federal 
governments have created incentives and influenced the decision of state governments to 
undertake fiscal adjustments. Furthermore, it examines how these changes contributed to the 
success or failure of said adjustments. After evaluating and confirming the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, a Multinomial Logit model was used to estimate how these changes 
affected choices (using ‘no adjustments’ as the base outcome at all times). We found, as 
international literature has suggested, that changes to budget institutions do affect fiscal 
results, and we noted that impacts depend on the rigidity of the budget rule under analysis. In 
addition, in the case of Brazil, institutional changes noticeably created previously nonexistent 
incentives for state governments to make fiscal adjustments. 
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Resumo 
Este artigo busca determinar se mudanças institucionais implementadas por governos federais 
criaram incentivos e influenciaram a decisão de governos estaduais efetuarem ajustes fiscais. 
Além disso, examina como essas mudanças contribuíram no sucesso ou no fracasso desses 
ajustes. Após avaliar e confirmar a independência das alternativas irrelevantes, utilizamos um 
modelo Logit Multinomial para estimar como essas mudanças afetam as escolhas (utilizando 
‘não ajuste’ como outcome base em todos os casos). Encontramos, como a literatura 
internacional sugere, que mudanças nas instituições orçamentárias afetam resultados fiscais, e 
que o impacto depende da rigidez da regra orçamentária em análise. Adicionalmente, no caso 
do Brasil, mudanças institucionais criaram, de forma notável, incentivos previamente não 
existentes para que governos estaduais efetuassem ajustes fiscais. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Researchers have recently identified a trend of redirecting fiscal-responsibility issues 
to subnational administrative levels and concurrent efforts to set up budgetary institutions to 
impose fiscal discipline on these government levels (municipalities and states, according to 
Bails and Tieslau, 2000). Furthermore, the literature on fiscal results emphasizes the role of 
budgetary institutions on fiscal outcomes (Stein et alli, 1998) and has found evidence that, in 
Latin American countries, “budgetary institutions have had an important effect on primary 
deficits” (Alesina et alli 1996). 
What makes Brazil an extremely interesting case is the responsive behavior of state 
governments to the institutional changes put in practice. Since implementation of the anti-
inflation plan in 1994, Brazil, a federative republic in which the central government has the 
power to impose budget legislation on subnational governments
1, has implemented three 
changes to budgetary institutions. These changes sought to reduce the dependence level of 
subnational governments (on the federal government, in terms of financing) by reconstructing 
their budget constraint and inducing positive fiscal results. According to data published by the 
National Treasury Secretariat (STN – Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional), it seems that these 
institutional changes, implemented by the federal government from 1995 on, have induced 
this responsive behavior and motivated states to make fiscal adjustments. 
 
 
        Table 1: Average fiscal result for 1986-1994 and 1995-2001 
States Average  fiscal 
result 
(1986 – 1994) 
% of state GDP 
Average fiscal 
result 
(1995 – 2001) 
% of state GDP 
Acre (AC)  -2.267  0.002 
Alagoas (AL)  -0.294  1.269 
Amazonas (AM)  -0.322  0.412 
Amapá (AP)  -1.843  1.721 
Bahia (BA)  -0.095  -0.787 
Ceará (CE)  -0.556  -1.085 
Distrito Federal (DF)  -0.062  0.017 
Espírito Santo (ES)  -0.888  -0.935 
Goiás (GO)  -2.646  -1.191 
Maranhão (MA)  2.056  1.873 
Minas Gerais (MG)  -0.232  -0.768 
Mato Grosso do Sul (MS)  -1.393  -0.109 
Mato Grosso (MT)  -3.220  0.063 
Pará (PA)  0.315  -0.180 
Paraíba (PB)  -1.664  0.317 
Pernambuco (PE)  0.008  -1.150 
Piauí (PI)  -1.432  1.063 
Paraná (PR)  0.135  -2.263 
Rio de Janeiro (RJ)  -1.046  -1.380 
Rio Grande do Norte (RN)  -1.653  -1.387 
Rondônia (RO)  -2.363  -1.945 
Roraima (RR)  -3.587  -0.189 
Rio Grande do Sul (RS)  0.097  -1.302 
Santa Catarina (SC)  -0.359  -0.341 
Sergipe (SE)  -0.263  -1.025 
                                                 
1 Articles 22 and 24 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution list subjects that the federal government is exclusively 
entitled to legislate on, and subjects that it is entitled to legislate concurrently with states and municipalities.  São Paulo (SP)  -1,481  0,041 
Tocantins (TO)  -13,021  -0,793 
Source: Data for primary results were obtained from the STN, and for state GDP, 
from the IBGE (retrieved from IPEADATA). Unlike other states, the average fiscal 
result for the state of Tocantins was calculated for the period from 1990 to 1994, 
because we did not have a longer time series.  
 
Considering the twenty six states and the Federal District, just five produced positive 
fiscal results, on average, between 1986 and 1994
2. Taking into account the period in which 
these changes were put into effect, between 1995 and 2001, the number of “adjusting” states 
increased to ten. Additionally, sixteen states were found to have made some fiscal effort at 
reducing deficits. Given this undeniable finding, we intend to analyze whether the 
implemented institutional changes actually created incentives for state governments to 
undertake fiscal adjustments. 
The existing literature has only analyzed how budgetary institutions affect fiscal 
results
3. However, this impact has yet to be investigated in terms of incentives, decision-
making processes and their influences. 
As such, the question that we intend to answer is: do institutional changes create 
incentives and influence the decisions of state governments to undertake fiscal adjustments? 
Moreover, do they influence the odds of an adjustment being successful?
4 This study seeks to 
contribute to the literature on the incentives and decision-making processes behind fiscal 
adjustments by testing the importance of institutional changes on them.  
Of course, this is not a simple task. There are different measures of adjustment
5 and 
varying definitions of successful adjustments
6 in the literature.  
The literature focused on country studies uses several measures of fiscal adjustments: 
a) 1.5% of GDP (Lambertini and Tavares, 2000), with different time horizons; b) an 
improvement, for two years in a row, of the budget balance by 1250 basis points (von Hagen 
and Strauch, 2001); c) a 250 basis-point improvement of the budget balance as a trigger, and a 
total improvement of, at least 2000 basis points after at least two years (Heylen and Everaert, 
2000); or d) a cut in the primary spending/GDP ratio of at least 5% of GDP over seven years 
(Hauptmeier et alli, 2006)
7.  According to Mierau et alli (2007), the definition in von Hagen 
and Strauch (2001) is meant to capture rapid adjustments, and the one in Heylen and Everaert 
(2000), gradual ones. 
On the other hand, if we consider adjustments at the state administrative level, 
researchers have used 1.0% of state GDP as a standard measure (Feld and Schaltegger, 2005).  
This paper uses two measures of adjustment (1.5% and 1.0% of state GDP, which are 
more appropriate for Brazilian standards, based on a substantial sample analysis) and three 
                                                 
2 Brazil was ruled by a military government from 1964 to 1985. Although elected by the Congress, a civilian 
president came to power in 1986.  
3 See Poterba (1996a,b), Bohn and Inman (1996), Poterba and Rueben (1997) and Bails and Tieslau (2000). 
4 Our research questions are similar to those asked by Alesina and Perotti (1996). However, our focus is on the 
decision-making process behind fiscal adjustments, defining what influences the choices and the decision of state 
governments to undertake a fiscal adjustment. Mierau et alli (2007) is a recent exception and analyzes decision-
making processes behind fiscal adjustments.  
5 A threshold must be specified in order to limit our analysis to cases in which adjustments result from 
intentional actions, rather than from cyclical fluctuations. 
6 Alesina and Perotti (1995) define success as a relatively permanent consolidation of the budget. 
7  This is the definition of “ambitious reformers”, as opposed to “timid” ones. The period of adjustment begins 
“with the year of maximum total expenditure in relation to GDP” (Hauptmeier et alli, 2006, pp.5). different definitions of what makes an adjustment successful (two intended to capture rapid 
adjustments – two and three years – and one to capture gradual ones: more than four years)
8.  
The decision to evaluate the fiscal-adjustment process, from the institutional change 
that triggers it, to the adjustment outcome, requires a merger of two research fields into one 
study: the literature on how institutional changes affect fiscal adjustments; and the literature 
on what makes an initial adjustment succeed. From this merger follows our decision to use a 
multinomial logit model to capture the three possibilities involved: no adjustment, successful 
adjustment and failed adjustment. 
We acknowledge the restrictive weakness of using previously specified measures of 
adjustment
9, but empirically, and based on existing literature, we found it to be the only 
feasible option. 
One must keep in mind, though, that while governments are responsible for fiscal 
results, they also assume responsibility for the welfare of their citizens. If state governments 
maximize the welfare function of their residents, then the highest welfare function proves to 
be the highest probability of a choice j, such that k j U U P k j ≠ > ), ( . Considering the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Greene, 2003)
10, and following a simultaneous 
decision-making process, alternative Yi indicates the government’s choice, considering all 
existing alternatives. The probability of variable j being selected is given by ) ( j Y P i = . This 
choice will depend on each state’s set of characteristics (fiscal, social and economic), 
represented by vector Xi. The use of a Multinomial Logit model to estimate equations provides 
us with a set of probabilities for J+1 choices for the decision maker.       
In order to achieve this objective, this paper has been organized into five sections, 
including this introduction. Section two provides a brief literature review of the importance of 
budgetary institutions in determining fiscal results. This section also contains a brief synopsis 
of Brazilian institutional changes in the 1990s and turn of the 21
st century. The third section 
describes the empirical analysis. The empirical results, reported in section four, demonstrate 
that institutional changes influenced the decision-making process behind fiscal adjustments. 
Finally, in section five, we discuss our primary results and make some brief conclusions. 
 
2. Changes to budgetary institutions and state-government budget constraints 
 
First of all, we need to standardize a few definitions. We define budgetary institutions 
as “all the rules and regulations according to which budgets are drafted, approved, and 
implemented” (Alesina and Perotti., 1996, pp.401). Moreover, they identify types of rules and 
regulations: a) numerical targets; b) procedural rules; and c) rules of transparency.
11 The 
literature focuses on two levels when analyzing fiscal results: a) federal; and b) state. Our 
analysis concentrates on the latter. 
From this point, we can establish a theoretical comparison
12, for illustrative purposes 
only, between a federative country, such as Brazil, and the European Union. This theoretical 
assumption allows us to say that states, in the case of Brazil, and member governments, in the 
case of the E.U., expect the monetary authority to bail out insolvent members, thus reducing 
                                                 
8 A successful adjustment occurs whenever the budget deficit is reduced by at least a certain rate, after a defined 
period. See the appendix for definitions of successful fiscal adjustments under use. 
9 There may be some intended adjustments that the proposed model will not be able to capture due to an 
empirical time-horizon constraint. 
10 The disturbances are independent and homoskedastic. Hausman tests have been performed. 
11 For a detailed definition, please refer to the original paper. 
12 This comparison is based on the one made by von Hagen (1991) between European Union member states and 
American state governments. their fiscal discipline. As a consequence, overall success is put in jeopardy (the Brazilian 
Federal Government or the European Union).
13  
On the other hand, according to von Hagen (1991), the design of formal fiscal 
restraints must be done with care, given that they have an impact on fiscal policies, although 
without affecting extreme cases. 
Based on findings from Hallerberg et alli (2006), whose study focused on the 
European Union, we would expect more stringent fiscal rules to contribute to fiscal discipline. 
However, the authors add, “…the choice of institutions to strengthen fiscal discipline and 
their impacts depend critically on the type of government and, hence, the political 
environment and constitutional characteristics such as the electoral system” (Hallerberg et 
alli, 2006, pp. 20). Since we are dealing with state governments in our proposed study, the 
type of government, the political environment, and constitutional characteristics such as the 
electoral system are all identical, or at least extremely similar.  
At this point it is interesting to highlight the conclusion of Hauptmeier et alli (2006), 
since it corroborates the initiative of implementing changes to budget institutions and 
imposing these changes on subnational governments in Brazil: “Virtually all episodes of 
ambitious reform featured the strengthening of national and sub-national budgetary 
procedures and institutions” (Hauptemeier et alli, 2006, pp. 42). 
Analyzing American state governments, Bohn and Inman (1996) showed that balanced 
budget rules, when appropriately constructed and with appropriate enforcement, reduce the 
propensity of these states to run deficits. Their analysis leads to four main conclusions:  
 
“1) balanced-budget constraints that apply to an audited, end-of-year fiscal 
balance are significantly more effective than constraints requiring only a beginning-
of-the-year balance; 2) all state balanced-budget rules are ultimately enforced by a 
state’s Supreme Court. Those states whose supreme courts are directly elected by 
citizens have ‘stronger’ constraints (which lead to larger average surpluses) compared 
to those states whose supreme court justices are political appointments of the governor 
or legislature; 3) there is tentative evidence that constraints grounded in the state’s 
constitution are more effective than constraints based upon statutory provisions; 4) 
budget surplus states are slightly less responsive to cyclical swings in income and 
unemployment than are surpluses in states with weak requirements” (Bohn and Inman, 
1996, pp. 64).  
 
Poterba and Rueben (1997) also investigated the effects of state fiscal institutions on 
state bond costs in American state governments, using a panel of forty US states, during the 
period from 1973 to 1996. They found that the American states with tighter anti-deficits rules, 
and more restrictive provisions on the authority of state legislatures to issue debt, paid lower 
interest rates on their bonds. States with binding revenue-limitation measures tend to face 
higher borrowing rates by approximately the same amount, while states with expenditure 
limits face lower borrowing costs. The fiscal laws that control expenditures or restrict taxes 
have different impacts on borrowing costs. In the first situation, the cost is higher than in the 
second. 
In addition, Bails and Tieslau (2000), using a panel of forty-nine American states, with 
data from 1969 to 1994, demonstrated that the imposition of a balanced budget requirement is 
not an effective tool for reducing government expenditures, unless it is combined with tax and 
spending limitations. 
And finally, Alt and Lowry (1994), as well as Poterba (1994), recommend balanced-
budget laws as suitable tools for the state level, but not for the federal level.  
 
                                                 
13 Please note, however, as von Hagen (1991) stated, that the degree of economic integration is much higher in a 
federative government than in an economic union.   2.1. The institutional framework that created an incentive scheme and induced 
fiscal adjustments in Brazil  
 
Three changes to budgetary institutions have impacted state-level budget constraints 
since the mid-nineties
14, ending (or at least reducing) past fiscal profligacy, and at the same 
time ending a history of soft-budget constraints: a) the Bacha Effect
15, which results from 
severe reductions of inflation rates; b) the restructuring of states’ debt; and c) the law of fiscal 
responsibility.  
The Real Plan, with effects from 1994 on, imposed changes on budget institutions at 
all levels of government. It involved fiscal adjustment, a wage adjustment, an exchange-rate 
anchor, and tight monetary policy, while seeking not only to control inflation, but also to 
balance national and subnational government accounts - “it provided the federal government 
with leverage to constrain the capacity of subnational actors to affect Brazil’s economy” 
(Samuels, 2003, pp. 547). With falling inflation rates, the possibility of managing fiscal 
accounts artificially, using seigniorage, was no longer feasible.
16 
Furthermore, according to Bevilacqua (2002) and Stein (1999), control of inflation 
confirmed the impossibility of maintaining federal financing for states’ increasing debt. Given 
that the majority of state governments (25 out of 27)
17 owned commercial banks to manage 
their cash, they were able to finance deficits via these banks. The issuing of state debt was 
controlled by state treasuries and easily absorbed by state-run banking institutions. When a 
state-run bank had liquidity problems, the Central Bank of Brazil offered emergency credit 
lines. This was the easiest way to manage state finances, making all these state-run banking 
institutions, at least pragmatically, money issuers. With the implementation of the Real Plan, 
and the consequent drop in inflation rates, the Central Bank could not continue to bail out 
failed banks.  
As a consequence, after 1994, the Central Bank of Brazil intervened in several state-
run banks, leading many to privatizations and negotiated agreements to refinance state debts. 
According to Bevilacqua (2002), this process began with the federal intervention of Brazil’s 
most powerful state-run bank – BANESPA (Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo) or the Sao Paulo 
State Bank – in December, 1994. After the intervention, the bank was privatized, and the state 
of Sao Paulo was the first to sign a binding agreement with the federal government, through 
which it agreed to assume all of Sao Paulo’s debt.
18 
19 Afterwards, “Sao Paulo [became] one 
of the reform states, making it more technically feasible to impose budget constraint[s] on the 
states as a group” (Dillinger and Webb, 1999, pp.33). In other words, the act of intervening 
into the most powerful state banking institution reinforced the central government’s 
credibility. 
                                                 
14 After 1994, with the implementation of the anti-inflation plan known as the Real Plan. 
15 Also known as the Tanzi Effect, in which politicians reduce real expenditures by delaying disbursements, so 
inflation can erode their value. 
16 Bacha (1994) argues that asymmetric price-level restatement of the public budget – keeping the real value of 
revenue from changing, and depreciating expenditures – enabled the existence of an artificial balance of public 
accounting, concealing a huge potential deficit. This effect is known in Brazil as the “Bacha Effect”. 
17 According to Werlang and Novaes (1993). 
18 Elevation of the federal interest rate in 1995 was one of the reasons Bevilacqua (2002) mentioned as being 
responsible for the states’ debt restructuring. An appreciated exchange rate was one of the anchors of the 
stabilization plan, avoiding pressure on price indexes. Despite this policy leading to a higher fiscal effort, the 
Central Bank of Brazil raised interest rates in order to keep exchange rates appreciated. Several states were 
unable to endure this policy, combined with the changes to budgetary institutions already mentioned.  
19 Despite the fact that negotiation of the State of Sao Paulo’s debt took place between 1995 and 1996, the 
specific law, promulgated on September, 1997, established the criteria for renegotiation between states and the 
federal government. In general, after consolidation of state debts at the federal level
20, subnational 
governments agreed to pay 12% of their current net revenue as debt service. If total interest 
exceeded this amount, then the excess would be capitalized and deferred until repayment of 
the principal. In order to help states, the federal government negotiated a debt extension, and 
the Senate established a resolution: state governments, which had an indebtness threshold of 
more than two times their current net revenue, had fifteen years to adjust it to this level. The 
adjustment had to occur in a specific way: 1/15th of the total maladjustment per year.
 If states 
did not pay the debt service, then the federal government had legal support to confiscate 
transfers in order to guarantee payment. 
In 2000, the federal government passed the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, aimed at 
solidifying incentives for fiscal discipline at all levels of government and all branches of 
power: Executive, Legislative and Judicial. The Law of Fiscal Responsibility has sought to 
push more public-sector responsibilities onto state and local governments. According to 
Alesina  et alli (1996), the Fiscal Responsibility Law can be interpreted as a law that 
establishes fiscal constraints and requires transparency of documents and procedures
21, while 
imposing penalties for abuses.  
Alesina et alli (1996) consider Brazil a middle-group country in terms of transparency 
and legislative constraints on the deficit (along with Paraguay, Costa Rica, Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Guatemala). 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1. The model  
 
Our objective is to analyze incentives and the decision-making processes of state 
governments when undertaking fiscal adjustments. Once the decision to make an adjustment 
has taken place, the adjustment can either succeed or fail. Figure 1 shows the game tree that 
state governments face. 
 




Since we are dealing with fiscal institutions and fiscal performance, we must also 
consider potential endogeneity problems with budget rules (Poterba, 1994, 1996b, Alesina 
and Perotti, 1995). However, since our model analyzes federal rules imposed on state 
                                                 
20 State debt was swapped for federal debt on financial markets. 
21 Mendes (1999). 










22, we assume, at least for the state level, that budget rules are 
exogenous.
23 
The Multinomial Logit model describes the likelihood that a certain event j will occur, 
for a specific set of characteristics included in vector Xi. The Multinomial Logit model, in this 
case, estimated three equations, taking the value [1] (No Fiscal Adjustment) of the dependent 
variable as the base outcome. The estimated equations provide the likelihood of choosing a 
J+1  alternative. In this case, there are three alternatives: [1] No Fiscal Adjustment, [2] 
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The coefficients of the model are not interpreted directly, nor are marginal effects 
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For continuous variables, the marginal effect is the change in likelihood of event j 
occurring due to a change in the independent variable (average value). For dummy variables, 
the marginal effect represents the effects of a discrete change from 0 to 1
24. 
According to Greene (2003), the Multinomial Logit model assumes that disturbances 
are independent and homoskedastic. If a model includes a subset of irrelevant alternatives, 
then the estimates become inefficient, although not inconsistent. Whenever irrelevant 
alternatives are not independent, the estimators are inconsistent. The Hausman test (Chi-
square) proposed by Hausman and McFadden (1984) is presented, in order to assure the 





A random variable (Yi ) defines the choice of Brazilian state governments. It has been 
constructed based on identified adjustment episodes within the period under study, as shown 
in Table 2, prepared by the authors: 
 
                                                 
22 Known as “top-bottom” formulation of budget rules. 
23 Alesina et alli (1996), in order to use budgetary institutions as explanatory variables for fiscal results, assume 
that they are exogenous or predetermined. This derives from the fact that they cannot be easily changed in 
response to current or past fiscal results. 
24 Marginal effects of estimated coefficients have been estimated and are available upon request.  
Table 2: Identified adjustment episodes 
 
Adjustments - 1.5% of state GDP  Adjustments - 1.0% of state GDP 
Adjustments - 1.0% of state GDP  N/A 75
Adjustments - 1.5% of state GDP  52 N/A
Successful adjustments - two years definition 20 24
Successful adjustments - three years definition 14 15
Successful adjustments - more than four years definition 13 19
Source: National Treasuty Secretariat (STN)  
 
Table 3 shows how the dependent variable (Yi ) was derived for this study. 
 
Table 3: Description of the dependent variable 
 
= 1 No Fiscal Adjustment 
= 2 Success (after the initial adjustment, proceed 
with one of the definitions of success – two, three, 
four or more than four years) 
Yi  (depending on the measure used, 1.5% or 1.0% 
of state GDP) 
= 3 Failure (after the initial adjustment, the state 
government is not able to maintain a successful 
adjustment, according to the definitions presented 
- two, three or more than four years) 
   
 
The independent variables (Xi) used as determinants of state-government choices 
areGINI ,GRANTS , ELECTIONS and FRAC. 
TheGINI variable (GINI index) describes income inequality. Although it is 
uncommon to use this variable in subnational models, Persson and Tabellini (1994) found out 
its relevance when studying the relationship between inequality and growth. Inequality 
increases the demand for social expenditures (via median voter)
25, even though it does not 
lead to unbalanced budgets.  The tax burden on capital owners rises in order to maintain a 
balanced budget, but it ends up reducing return on capital, investment and growth rates. Since 
the balanced-budget hypothesis was not empirically investigated, we do not have any intuition 
regarding expected results.  
The  GRANTS variable is a proxy of subnational governments’ degree of dependence 
from vertical transfers from the federal government – it is calculated as a percentage of state 
revenues comprised of federal transfers. It is used as a control variable due to the fact that a 
significant portion of these transfers are earmarked, and the fact that many states depend 
heavily on them.
26 
27 Since the calculation of coefficients that stipulate transfers to each state 
takes per-capita income, inhabiting population and demographic density into account, these 
variables cannot be used separately without running into multicollinearity problems. Given 
some states’ heavy dependence, one might expect a significant flypaper effect: expenditures 
would grow more than revenue, thus worsening fiscal results.
28 The database used to 
construct this variable was obtained from the National Treasury Secretariat. 
The  FRAC variable, used to represent political fragmentation, was calculated 
according to the fragmentation of the Lower House immediately after elections. Since a more 
fragmented legislature hinders political negotiations, we expect a negative impact. 
                                                 
25 Prominent inequality makes the median-voter income similar to the income of the poor. This makes both 
choose the same alternatives. 
26 The 1988 Constitution earmarked a substantial proportion of revenue. 
27 The average share of transfers in states’ total revenue, from 1986 to 2001, was 39.50%. The minimum was 
0.39% and the maximum was 99.82%. 
28 Hines and Thaler (1995).  Lastly, the ELECTIONS variable was constructed as a dummy variable, with value 1 
for election years, and 0 otherwise. According to the political-cycle theory (Nordhaus, 1975, 
Rogoff and Silbert, 1988 and Rogoff, 1990), we expect a negative impact for this variable, 
since election years tend to have budget deficits. 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of independent variables used in the proposed 
econometric specification. 
 
  Table 4: Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Variable Obs Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
GINI 347 0.5798395 0.0406696 0.4255667 0.6664805
GRANTS 430 0.3953705 0.2359057 0.0039047 0.9982
FRAC 417 0.7942686 0.0885368 0.498 0.92  
 Source: National Treasury Secretariat. 
 
As discussed above, we wish to test whether or not three institutional changes have 
had an impact on state budget constraints. As such, they will be used in empirical 
tests:BACHA,  CTURE DEBTRESTRU  and  2000 LAW . 
29 
30 
The Bacha-effect variable,BACHA, was constructed as a dummy variable, with value 
0 until 1994, and 1 from 1995 on. We expect a positive effect on the likelihood of state 
governments undertaking fiscal adjustments. 
Considering that the effects of restructuring state debt would have a real impact from 
1998 on, the  CTURE DEBTRESTRU variable, which represents this change, will have value 
of 0 until 1997, and a value of 1 from 1998 on. Since renegotiation is based on a commitment 
with state governments, we expect a positive impact on the likelihood of state governments 
undertaking fiscal adjustments. 
The  2000 LAW  variable was also constructed as a dummy variable, with value 0 until 
2000 and value 1 from 2001 on. We expect a positive effect on the likelihood of state 
governments undertaking fiscal adjustments, based on the law’s design. 
  
4. Empirical Results 
 
Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the results from the Multinomial Logistic model estimation, 
with fiscal adjustment measures of 1.5% and 1.0% of state GDP, using the three definitions of 
successful adjustments (two, three or more than four years). The Hausman test, used to 
confirm the independence of irrelevant alternatives, ensures that the properties of the 
estimators are not violated. 
 
Insert table 5 here 
 
Insert table 6 here 
 
The estimated coefficients, j β , reflect the effect of X on the likelihood of each possible 
outcome [2] (Successful Fiscal Adjustment) and [3] (Failed Fiscal Adjustment) relative to the 
alternative [1] (No Fiscal Adjustment).  
                                                 
29 Demographic variables (size of population over sixty-five years old over total population, among others), have 
been tested, but did not produce significant results. 
30 We did not use lagged states’ indebtedness as a control variable, because data are only available from 1994 on. 
We would like to have used state inflation rate and state unemployment rates as control variables, but data are 
only available for select capital cities.  The variable representing inequality (GINI ) did not produce robust results with the 
1.5% of state GDP measure of adjustment, since the signals of estimated coefficients 
oscillated with the use of different definitions of success. When the 1.0% of state GDP was 
used, the GINI variable revealed a trend of lower odds of a fiscal adjustment occurring 
(despite the estimated coefficients not being significant). This may be due to the fact that, in 
the presence of higher inequality, state governments face a greater demand for social 
expenditures, thus worsening fiscal results. However, we are unable to attest that this effect 
leads to unbalanced budgets (Persson and Tabellini, 1994). 
The relevance of transfers to state budgets (GRANTS ) turned out to be important, 
increasing the odds of state governments making an adjustment. One might expect a different 
result for this variable, based on existing literature: given that a higher degree of dependence 
on the federal government by subnational governments generates the flypaper effect, the 
higher thatGRANTS are, the harder it would be for a state government to undertake an 
adjustment.  
The BACHA_EFFECT variable was significant in two cases: increasing the odds of a 
gradual, successful adjustment at 1.5% of state GDP (more than four years), and decreasing 
the odds of a rapid, successful adjustment at 1.0% of state GDP (two years). We do not have 
any insight, or even literature, to explain these alternate results.   
The restructuring of state-government debts (DEBTRESTRUCTURE ) was the 
institutional change that most influenced subnational governments when deciding whether to 
undertake fiscal adjustments
31, rather than not undertaking any – it was a determining factor 
for both measures of adjustment (1.5% and 1.0% of state GDP). Nevertheless, one cannot 
affirm that it was decisive when the success of the adjustment was put into question – the 
significance of the DEBTRESTRUCTURE variable varied for successful and unsuccessful 
adjustments. Depending on the definition of success, debt restructuring produced different 
results.  
According to the literature, “more transparent and hierarchical budgetary procedures 
lead to lower deficits and debt” (Stein et alli, 1998, pp. 17).
32 This finding restates our 
conclusion regarding the DEBTRESTRUCTURE variable. 
The Law of Fiscal Responsibility (variable LFR) increased the odds of rapid (three 
years) unsuccessful adjustments for both measures of adjustment. Unfortunately, since it has 
been implemented at the end of our series, we may be underestimating the potential effects of 
this institutional change. As soon as new data become available, we intend to extend this 
study in order to better evaluate its effects. 
The  FRAC variable,  which represents political fragmentation, only produced the 
expected results in one case: gradual adjustments at 1.5% of state GDP, but with no 
significance. Some results were significant, but in opposition to our initial beliefs. This is 
certainly a case for further study, since we do not have a clear idea of why a higher degree of 
legislative fragmentation would lead to a higher probability of state governments undertaking 
fiscal adjustments. 
The results for the ELECTIONS variable were in line with our expectations (except for 
one case), showing that, in election years, it is virtually impossible for fiscal adjustments to be 
                                                 
31 This is might be due to the fact that this institutional change was adequately designed in terms of enforcement. 
If state governments fail to meet their financial obligations, the federal government has legal support to 
confiscate transfers. In January, 1999, the Governor of Minas Gerais, Itamar Franco, unilaterally decreed a 90-
day moratorium on repayment of the state's estimated $13.5 billion debt to the federal government, which then 
decided to confiscate federal transfers to the state. This confirmed the institutional change as credible.  
32 One should understand “more transparent and hierarchical budgetary institutions” as “institutions that promote 
a more comprehensive view of the costs and benefits of government activities” (Stein et alli, 1998, pp. 16). undertaken: this variable was significant, reducing the odds of an adjustment, irrespective of 
the definition used for adjustment or success. 
 
5. Main Conclusions 
 
We have attempted to determine whether changes to budgetary institutions, 
implemented by the Brazilian federal government, created incentives and influenced the 
decisions of state governments to undertake fiscal adjustments, based on the results obtained 
herein. Moreover, in line with the international literature, we attempted to investigate whether 
they have influenced the odds of an adjustment succeeding or failing. 
In line with Eichengreen (1992), Poterba (1994), Alt and Lowry (1994) and Alesina et 
alli (1996), we found that budget institutions do have an impact on fiscal results; this led us to 
conclude that budget institutions are relevant when it comes to fiscal outcomes and the degree 
of fiscal discipline. However, the state governments’ choice of undertaking or forgoing a 
fiscal adjustment does not necessarily result in successful adjustments at all times.   
Analyzing the specific case of Brazil, we were able to conclude that the institutional 
changes implemented by the federal government had created incentives for state governments 
to make fiscal adjustments. Using data prior to 1995, state governments did not undertake any 
adjustments, because they did not have any incentive to do so. After 1995, and until 2001, 
they showed a clear trend that the required incentives may have been created, and they started 
making fiscal adjustments year after year. 
Contrary to our initial expectations, the BACHA_EFFECT variable was significant in 
just two cases: increasing the odds of a gradual successful adjustment at 1.5% of state GDP 
(more than four years), and decreasing the odds of a rapid successful adjustment at 1.0% of 
state GDP (two years). Since this result varies, we intend to conduct a more thorough analysis 
before discussing the efficiency of this institutional change. 
The restructuring of states-government debt (DEBTRESTRUCTURE) was the 
institutional change that most influenced subnational governments to undertake fiscal 
adjustments
33, rather than not undertaking any – it was a determining factor for both measures 
of adjustment (1.5% and 1.0% of state GDP). Nevertheless, one cannot affirm that it was 
decisive when the success of the adjustment was put into question – the significance of the 
DEBTRESTRUCTURE variable varied for both successful and unsuccessful adjustments. 
Depending on the definition of success, debt restructuring produced different results.  
Establishing a Law of Fiscal Responsibility did not have a significant impact on the 
decision to undertake a fiscal adjustment.
34 This finding is in line with Bails and Tieslau 
(2000), for whom “the imposition of a balanced requirement by itself does not seem to be an 
effective weapon for use in decreasing government expenditures” (Bails and Tieslau, 2000, 
pp.271). We may need to extend our analysis as soon as new data become publicly available.  
We also obtained four secondary results. Firstly, a higher amount of transfers from the 
federal government in the state’s budgets (represented by the GRANTS variable) increases the 
odds of the state government making an adjustment. One might expect a different result for 
this variable, based on existing literature: given that a higher degree of dependence on the 
                                                 
33 The reader may be puzzled and led to believe in the odds of the federal government having bought a state-
level adjustment: given that the DEBTRESTRUCTURE variable had produced extremely significant estimated 
coefficients, one might speculate that the federal government had federalized state debt in exchange for fiscal 
adjustments at the state level. However, after analyzing the full text of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, one finds 
that the federal government brilliantly designed an enforcement device: it is able to force highly dependent states 
to service their debt; otherwise it can retain federal transfers to these states. However, when it comes to the 
largest states, since they rely on local taxes, enforcement is not as efficient. 
34 This may also be due to the fact that the Law of Fiscal Responsibility was put into effect in 2001, at the end of 
our period of analysis. federal government by subnational governments generates the flypaper effect, the higher the 
GRANTS variable, the harder it is for a state government to make an adjustment, and the less 
incentive it would have. 
Secondly, the variable representing inequality (GINI ) did not produce robust results 
with the 1.5% of state GDP measure of adjustment, since the signals of estimated coefficients 
varied with the use of different definitions of success. When the 1.0% of state GDP measure 
of adjustment was used, the GINI variable tended to lower the odds of fiscal adjustments 
(even though the estimated coefficients were not significant). We believe that this might be 
due to the fact that in the presence of higher inequality, state governments face greater 
demand for social expenditures. However, we are unable to attest that this effect leads to 
unbalanced budgets (Persson and Tabellini, 1994). 
Thirdly, political fragmentation (FRAC) only produced the expected results in one 
case: gradual 1.5% of state GDP adjustments, but with no significance.  
Lastly, the results for election years (ELECTIONS) are in line with our expectations 
(except for one case), showing that, in election years, it is virtually impossible for fiscal 
adjustments to be undertaken: it significantly reduced the odds of an adjustment, irrespective 
of the definition used for adjustment or success. 
 APPENDIX 
 
In this study, the definitions of fiscal adjustment, and consequently, the definitions of 
successful fiscal adjustment, abide by those set out in Lambertini and Tavares (2001), save for 
the fact that one more specification of adjustment (1.0% of state GDP) and one more 
definition of length for successful adjustments (more than four years) have been included. It 
follows then that: 
 
1.  Fiscal adjustment – 1.5% of state GDP: 
 
A period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the primary deficit is reduced by at least 
1.5% of state GDP from the previous calendar year (fiscal and calendar years are coincidental 
for Brazilian government entities). Let  t D be the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio in year t. 
There is a fiscal adjustment in period t if 
 
  1 0.015 tt DD − −≤ −  
 
2.  Fiscal adjustment – 1.0% of state GDP: 
 
A period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the primary deficit is reduced by at least 
1.0% of state GDP from the previous calendar year. Let  t D be the primary deficit-to-GDP 
ratio in year t. 
There is a fiscal adjustment in period t if  
 
1 0.010 tt DD − −≤ −  
 
3.  Successful Fiscal adjustment - two years definition: 
 
A fiscal adjustment is defined as successful if the average change in the primary deficit-
to-GDP ratio is less than or equal to zero in the two calendar years following the year the 
deficit was cut. Following the definitions above, it follows then that: 
The fiscal adjustment in period t is successful if  
 
12 1 {[ ] [ ]}
0
2
tttt DDDD ++ + −+ −
≤  
 
4.  Successful Fiscal adjustment - three years definition: 
 
A fiscal adjustment is defined as successful if the average change in the primary deficit-
to-GDP ratio is less than or equal to zero in the three calendar years following the year the 
deficit was cut. Following the definitions above, it follows then that: 
The fiscal adjustment in period t is successful if 
 
12 1 3 2 { [ ][ ][ ] }
0
3





 5.  Successful Fiscal adjustment  - more than four years definition: 
 
A fiscal adjustment is defined as successful if the average change in the primary deficit-
to-GDP ratio is less than or equal to zero in the n (as long as  4 n > ) calendar years following 
the year the deficit was cut. Following the definitions above, it follows then that: 
The fiscal adjustment in period t is successful if 
 
12 1 3 2 4 3 1 { [ ][ ][ ][ ]. . .[ ] }
0
tttt tt tt t n t n DDDD DD DD DD
n
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≤  
 
Use of this definition is crucial because it includes political-cycle implications in our 
model. Considering a measure of success that analyses periods of more than four years, we 




Alesina, A., Hausmann, R., Hommes, R. and Stein, E. (1996). Budget institutions and fiscal 
performance in Latin América. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper No. 
5586. 
 
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1995) Fiscal expansions adn fiscal adjustments in OECD 
countries. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper No. 5214. 
 
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1996) The American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No.2, Papers 
and Proceedings of the Hundredth and Eight Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association San Francisco, CA, January 5-7, 1996. (May, 1996), p.401-407. 
 
Alesina, A. ,Perotti, R., Tavares, J. Obsfeld, M. and Eichengreen, B. (1998) The political 
economy of fiscal adjustments. Brookings Papers on Economy Activity, Vol. 1, p. 197-248. 
 
Alesina, A., Roubini, N. and Cohen,G. D. (1997) Political cycles and the macroeconomic. 
The MIT Press. 
 
Alt, J.E. and Lowry, R. C. (1994) Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget 
Deficits: Evidence from the States. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, p.811-
828. 
 
Bacha, E. L. (1994) O Fisco e a Inflação: uma interpretação do caso brasileiro. Revista de 
Economia Política, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 5-17. 
 
Bails, D. and Tieslau, M. A. (2000) The impact of fiscal constitutions on State and local 
expenditures. Cato Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2. 
 
Bevilacqua, A. S. (2002) State Government Bailouts in Brazil. Inter-American 
Development Bank, Research Network #R-441. 
 
Blais, A. and Nadeau, R. (1992) The electoral budget cycle. Public Choice, Vol. 74, No. 4. 
 
Bohn, H. and Inman, R.P. (1996) Balanced-Budget Rules and Public Deficits: evidence from 
U.S. States. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 45, p. 13-76.  
Dillinger, W. and Webb, S.B. (1999) Fiscal management in federal democracies: Argentina 
and Brazil. World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2121, Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
 
Eichengreen, B. (1992) Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved? Princeton Studies in 
International Finance, No. 74. 
 
Feld, L. P. and Schaltegger, C. A. (2005) Voters as a hard budget constraint: on the 
determination of intergovernmental grants. Public Choice, Vol. 123, Nos. 1-2 (April). 
 
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric Analysis. 5th edition. NY: Prentice Hall. 
 
Hallerberg, M., Strauch, R. and von Hagen, J. (2006) The design of fiscal rules and forms of 
governance in European Union countries. Government and the Efficiency of Economic 
Systems – GESY, Discussion paper No. 150, June, 2006. 
 
Hauptmeier, S., Heipertz, M. and Schuknecht, L. (2006) Expenditure reform in industrialized 
countries: a case study approach. European Central Bank Working Paper Series, Working 
paper No. 634, May, 2006. 
 
Hausman J, McFadden D. (1984) Specification tests for the multinomial logit model. 
Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 5, p. 1219-1240. 
 
Heylen, F. and Everaert, G. (2000) Success and failure of fiscal consolidation in the OECD: A 
multivariate analysis. Public Choice, Vol. 105, pp. 103–124. 
 
Hines, J. R. and Thaler, R. H. (1995) Anomalies: the flypaper effect. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 217-226. 
 
Jones, M. P., Sanguinetti, P. and Tommasi, M. (2000) Politics, institutions, and fiscal 
performance in a federal system: an analysis of the Argentine provinces. Journal of 
Development Economics, Vo. 61, p. 305-333. 
 
Lambertini, L. and Tavares, J. (2000). Exchange rates and fiscal adjustments: Evidence from 
the OECD and implications for EMU. Mimeo: UC Los Angeles. 
 
Mendes, M. (1999) Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal: Análise e Alternativas. Instituto 
Fernand Braudel de Economia Mundial, São Paulo. 
 
Mierau, J. O., Jong-A-Pin, R. and de Haan, J. (2007) Do political variables affect fiscal policy 
adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence. Public Choice, forthcoming 2007. Available 
electronically at < http://congress.utu.fi/epcs2006/docs/C4_de_haan.doc>. 
 
Nordhaus, W. (1975) The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 42 
(April), pp. 169-190. 
 
Persson, T. and Guido Tabellini. (1994) Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 84, p. 600-21. 
 Poterba, J. (1994) States Responses to Fiscal Crisis: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and 
Politics. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 4, p. 799-821, August, 1994. 
 
Poterba, J. (1996a) Budget institutions and fiscal policy in the U.S. states. The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 86, No.2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundredth and Eight 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association San Francisco, CA, January 5-7, 
1996. (May, 1996), pp.395-400. 
 
Poterba, J. (1996b) Do budget rules work? National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper No. 5550, April, 1996.  
 
Poterba, J. and Rueben, K.S. (1997) State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond 
Market. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper No. 6237. 
 
Rogoff, K. (1990) Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. American Economic Review, Vol. 
80, No. 1, p. 21-36. 
 
Rogoff, K. and Silbert, A. (1988) Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. Review of 
Economic Studies. Vol. 55. 
 
Roubini, N. and Sachs,J. (1989a). Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial 
Countries. Economic Policy, Vol. 89, p. 99-132. 
 
Samuels, D. (2003) Fiscal Straightjacket: The Politics of Macroeconomic Reform in Brazil 
1995-2002. Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 35. 
 
Stein, E. (1999) Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size in Latin America. Journal of 
Applied Economics, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 357-391. 
 
Stein, E., Talvi, E. and Grisanti, A. (1998) Institutional arrengements and fiscal performance: 
the Latin American experience. Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief 
Economist, Working paper No. 367, February, 1998. 
 
von Hagen, J. (1991) A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints. Journal 
of Public Economics, Vol. 44, p.199-210. 
 
von Hagen, J and Strauch, R. R. (2001) Fiscal consolidations: Quality, economic conditions 
and success. Public Choice, Vol. 109, p. 327-346. 
 
Werlang, S. R. C., Novaes Filho, W. (1993) Financial Integration and Public Financial 




           Table 5: Multinomial Logistic Regression with adjustments of 1.5% of state GDP 
Type of adjustment
Alternatives [2]/[1] [3]/[1] [2]/[1] [3]/[1] [2]/[1] [3]/[1]
GINI -0.129 1.505 -0.257 -0.379 -0.175 0.731
-0.521 -0.967 -0.529 -0.828 -0.437 -0.898
GRANTS 2.946 5.235 3.222 3.579 2.172 8.492
(1.621)* -3.392 (1.785)* (1.858)* -1.753 (2.170)***
BACHA_EFFECT -0.688 -0.470 0.081 -1.115 0.662 -19.477
-0.497 -1.078 -0.461 -1.269 (0.373)* 0.000
DEBTRESTRUCTURE 1.020 1.059 0.330 1.805 -0.071 21.266
(0.532)* -1.142 -0.502 -1.146 -0.400 (0.919)***
LFR 0.321 0.026 -0.091 1.168 0.279 -0.240
-0.557 -1.053 -0.630 (0.691)* -0.480 -0.799
FRAC 2.444 5.611 0.384 8.822 -0.225 -0.384
-1.803 -4.555 -1.798 (4.755)* -1.510 -4.354
ELECTIONS -0.698 -0.022 -0.160 -0.480 0.006 -0.794
(0.375)* -0.736 -0.358 -0.543 -0.305 -0.671
Constant -3.635 -8.174 -2.202 -10.384 -1.382 -3.335
(1.366)*** (3.687)** (1.319)* (3.898)*** -1.109 -3.044
Observations




Hausman-type test of IIA (     
2) 
#
Hausman-type test of IIA (Prob >      
2 ) 
#
Hausman-type test of IIA (     
2) 
+
Hausman-type test of IIA (Prob >      
2) 
+
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Multi = 1 (No Fiscal adjustment) is the base outcome
IIA means Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Ho: odds (outcome-J vs. outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. (for Ho) means evidence.
# Full multinomial logit model versus restricted multinomial model, excluding alternative 3 (Failure)
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Table 6: Multinomial Logistic Regression with adjustments of 1.0% of state GDP 
Type of adjustment
Alternatives [2]/[1] [3]/[1] [2]/[1] [3]/[1] [2]/[1] [3]/[1]
GINI -0.07 -0.096 -0.322 -1.009 -0.2 -0.446
(0.4480) (0.7430) (0.4900) (0.6250) (0.3710) (0.8630)
GRANTS 1.458 2.559 2.685 2.338 1.072 3.847
(1.5330) (1.9520) (1.9040) (1.4240) (1.4190) (1.784)**
BACHA_EFFECT -0.981 -0.217 -0.329 -1.052 0.477 -19.741
(0.457)** -0.748 -0.442 -0.904 -0.328 0.000
DEBTRESTRUCTURE 0.98 0.829 0.216 1.748 -0.148 20.504
(0.496)** -0.715 (0.5050) (0.838)** -0.368 (0.730)***
LFR 0.402 0.697 -0.328 1.435 0.290 1.037
-0.508 -0.743 -0.696 (0.599)** -0.449 -0.793
FRAC 3.962 6.418 1.525 8.479 1.478 7.743
(1.882)** (3.604)* (1.8930) (3.641)** -1.368 -5.653
ELECTIONS -0.666 -0.734 -0.251 -1.167 -0.082 -0.789
(0.345)* -0.522 (0.3530) (0.443)*** -0.279 -0.556
Constant -4.412 -7.913 -2.692 -9.334 -2.125 -9.057
(1.447)*** (2.864)*** (1.409)* (2.945)*** (1.021)** (4.388)**
Observations




Hausman-type test of IIA (     
2) 
#
Hausman-type test of IIA (Prob >      
2 ) 
#
Hausman-type test of IIA (     
2) 
+
Hausman-type test of IIA (Prob >      
2) 
+
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Multi = 1 (No Fiscal adjustment) is the base outcome
IIA means Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Ho: odds (outcome-J vs. outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. (for Ho) means evidence.
# Full multinomial logit model versus restricted multinomial model, excluding alternative 3 (Failure)
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